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1 Introduction
The literature on successive oligopolies is traditionally based on examples, con-
cerning the technology used by firms to produce the final output: downstream
firms are assumed to have the same linear technology using a single input. In
this paper, we go on with this tradition, but now introduce the alternative as-
sumption that downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology.
Here we assume that the Cobb-Douglas production function f(z) =
√
z, with
z denoting the amount of input, is used in the production process. Our main
concern is whether the major conclusions reached under constant returns still
hold when a decreasing returns technology is substituted to the linear one.
Comparing this solution with the linear case, it turns out that several fea-
tures are different from those observed under constant returns. First, we show
that double marginalisation is less severe under decreasing returns than under
constant returns, reflecting the fact that the cost per unit is higher in the latter
than in the former. Second, we prove that, contrary to intuition, the profit of
a downstream firm, under a decreasing returns technology, may be decreasing
with the number of upstream firms. On the contrary, this cannot happen un-
der a constant returns technology. Moreover, we find that, in contrast with
the linear case, increasing simultaneously the number of firms in both markets
(upstream and downstream), does not let the input market price to converge to
the competitive one, namely the marginal cost of producing the input. Finally,
we compare the effects of mergers under both assumptions fixing the number
of firms in each market. For this particular example the effects of vertical in-
tegration on prices are going in opposite directions according as we assume a
linear, or a decreasing returns, technology. While the input and output prices
both increase in the former when vertical integration takes place, both decrease
in the latter.
The above discrepancies between market behaviour corresponding to alter-
native technological conditions reveal how fragile are the theoretical conclusions
obtained when analysing the interplay of firms’ strategies in successive mar-
kets. To get robust conclusions, a general theoretical framework for analysing
successive oligopolistic markets is clearly required.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop two
games, one in the dowsntream and the other in the upstream market, to obtain
the industry equilibria. In section 2, according to the technology used in the
downstream market, we analyse the effects of number of firms in profits, the
asymptotic properties of input and output prices, the size of double marginal-
ization, and finally, the effects of technology on collusive agreements. Section 3
concludes.
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2 Industry equilibria under decreasing returns
In this section, we develop the procedure through which prices and quantities
obtain in each market, downstream and upstream. This procedure is identical
to the method implicitly followed in the example considered in the literature on
successive oligopolies under constant returns, like Gaudet and Van Long (1996),
Ordover et al (1990), or Salinger (1988). There are two markets, the downstream
and upstream ones, with identical firms in each of them. In these markets, firms
select non cooperatively the quantities of output of the good they produce, the
output of the upstream firms serving as the only input used in the production of
the output in the downstream market. The link between the two markets follows
from the fact that the downstream firms’ unit cost appears as the unit revenue
for the upstream ones : the price paid for a unit of input for the firms in the
former constitutes the unit receipt for the firms in the latter. Furthermore, we
keep most of the traditional assumptions used in the constant returns example
proposed by the literature: linear demand in the downstream market, identical
production function for the downstream firms and identical linear total cost
for the upstream firms. Also we assume, as usual, that downstream firms are
price takers in the input market. Thus, we keep completely in line with the
traditional example considered in the literature on successive oligopolies, but
one : the production function of the downstream is no longer linear, but with
decreasing returns.
Formally, consider n downstream firms facing the linear demand pi(Q) =
1−Q in the downstream market.All of them share the same technology f(z) to
produce the output, namely
q = f(z) =
√
z.
We assume that this situation gives rise to a game, whose players are the n
downstream firms with output strategies qi.
The profits of the ith downstream firm at the vector of strategies (qi, q−i)
obtains as
Πi(qi, q−i) = (1− qi − Σk 6=iqk)qi − pq2i .
Given a vector of strategies (q1, ...qi, ..qn), the resulting input demand Σnk=1zk(p)
in the upstream market obtains as
Σnk=1zk(p) = Σ
n
k=1q
2
k.
Now assume that there are m identical upstream firms who produce the input z
at the same linear total cost βsj , j = 1, ..,m, β > 0. This gives rise to another
game whose players are the m upstream firms with strategies sj , j = 1, ..m.
Given a vector of strategies (s1, ...sj , ..sm),the jth upstream firm’s profit Γj
writes as
Γj(sj , s−j) = p(sj , s−j)sj − βsj . (1)
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Given an n-tuple of strategies (q1, ...qi, ..qn) and am−tuple of strategies (s1, ...sj , ..sm),
we may compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium of each of the above games
under the condition that the input price balances supply and demand in the in-
put market. The explicit values of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in each of
the above games are derived in Appendix 1.
Denoting (q∗(p), ...q∗(p), ..q∗(p)) and (s∗(p), ...s∗(p), ..s∗(p)) the symmetric
solution of each game, they must satisfy the equality
n (q∗(p))2 = ms∗(p). (2)
3 Number of firms and profits
3.1 Number of upstream firms and downstream profits
In this section, we compare how the profits of both downstream and upstream
firms depend on the technology used to produce the final output and on the
number of firms. Under oligopoly and linear output demand, decreasing linear
production cost must necessarly increase downstream firms’ profits. Accord-
ingly, since increasing the number of upstream firms leads to a decrease in the
input price, the profit of downstream oligopolists, must necessarly increase un-
der a constant returns technology. The first question we would like to raise is
whether this simple reasoning still applies when returns are decreasing. It turns
out that this is not always the case.
Proposition 1 The profit of a downstream firm may decrease if the competition
in the upstream market is fiercer. For instance, when the number of firms in
the dowsntream market does not exceed 3, profits of a dowsntream firm always
decreases when the number of upstream firms increases.
Proof. see appendix 3.
Kurz (1982) and Seade (1985) have shown that, under Cournot oligopoly,
it is not necessarly true that a decrease of production cost leads to an increase
of profits, a proposition analogous to ours. When the number of upstream
firms decreases, competition becomes fiercer in the upstream market and the
input price must necessarly decrease, increasing thereby the production cost of
dowsntream firms. In this case, we are back to Kurz and Seade effect: decreasing
competition in the upstream market does not necessarly entail higher profits for
the downstream firms. While it would never happen under constant returns that
lower profits would be observed at the equilibrium of the downstream market,
it can happen in the case of decreasing returns1.
Consider the profit function of a downstream firm, Πi = pi(m,n)f(z(m,n))−
p(m,n)z(m,n), under the alternative assumptions f(z) =
√
z or f(z) = z.
1Seade (1985) uses conditions on the elasticity on the market demand function to identify
when decreasing cost can increase profits. In our case, this condition bears on technology and
the relative number of firms, m and n, in the markets.
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Clearly,
∂Πi
∂m
=
∂pi
∂m
f(z) +
∂f
∂z
∂z
∂m
pi −
(
∂p
∂m
z +
∂z
∂m
p
)
.
Comparing the values of ∂Πi∂m under the two alternative assumptions, they
differ only by the fact that technologies differ from each other. With decreasing
returns, the final effect on the downstream profit can be of either sign because
the effect on the revenue incorporates the non-linear marginal productivity
∂f
∂z =
1
2
√
z
, of the input z. By constrast, when marginal productivity remains
constant, as in the linear technology, the effect on cost of an increasing number
of upstream firms always dominates its effect on revenues.
3.2 Asymptotic properties of input and output prices
It is interesting to analyse output and input prices when the number of firms
in each market is increased without limit. We should expect that, asympoti-
cally, both these prices should tend to the corresponding marginal costs. While
this property indeed holds under a linear technology, it fails to hold under
the decreasing returns. In order to show this property we use a replication
procedure introduced by Debreu and Scarf (1963) in the framework of a pure
exchange economy. Let us replicate r times the basic economy as described
above. Namely, in the r−th replica, downstream market demand is given by
r(1−Q) and there are rn downstream and rm upstream firms. Using formulas
(), () in the appendix 1, we notice that, in the rth-replica, the prices at which
demand is equal to supply both in the downstream and upstream markets, do
not depend on the number r, but depend only on m and n. Indeed, at the sym-
metric equilibrium in the upstream market, the input quantities supplied by
the m upstream firms have to be multiplied by r in the rth-replica; similarly for
the quantities demanded by the n downstream firms in the downstream mar-
ket. Consequently, the equality of supply and demand in the upstream market
eliminates the r− factor in each side of the equality. A similar reasoning applies
for the symmetric price equilibrium in the downstream market. It follows that
the study of the behaviour of the upstream and downstream markets when the
number of replications increases is equivalent to the study of the limit equilib-
rium prices and quantities, when the number of firms is rn and rm , instead of
n and m, in each market, respectively. This replication procedure thus leads
to increase, simultaneously and at the same speed, the number of firms in each
market. Contrary to intuition, we show in the next proposition that the input
price does not converge to its marginal cost under decreasing returns.
Proposition 2 Under decreasing returns (resp. constant returns), when the
number of replications of the basic economy tends to ∞, the equilibrium input
price does not (resp. does ) converge to upstream firms’ marginal cost.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
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The intuition of this proposition can be described as follows. Under decreas-
ing returns, when the number of replicas is increased, the equilibrium quantity
produced by each downstream firm, tends to zero. Accordingly, the marginal
productivity of input tends itself to infinity, making impossible the equality of
supply and demand in the upstream market. The volume of input demand can
be balanced with the input supply only by dampening demand with a price
which remains strictly higher than the marginal cost of producing the input,
whatever the number of replications2. In the linear case, marginal productivity
remains constant when the number of replications increases, which prevents a
similar phenomenon to arise.
3.3 Double marginalization under constant vs decreasing
returns
We now briefly address the size of double marginalization according to the
type of technology used by downstream firms to produce the output: decreas-
ing or constant returns. Double marginalization is defined as the sum of the
markup exercised by the upstream firms, p∗−β, and the markup applied by the
downstream firms, pi∗ − p∗, which yields pi∗ − β.Therefore, to compare double
marginalization according to the downstream technology, we compare output
prices under the two technologies. From the direct comparison of output prices
we obtain that:
Proposition 3 Double marginalization is lower when downstream firms use
decreasing returns than when they use constant returns technology.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
3.4 The effects of technology on collusive agreements
Collusive agreements between upstream and dowsntream firms eliminate dou-
ble marginalization, which yields to lower prices for the consumers of the final
product. On the other hand, these vertical integration agreements can lead to
foreclosure of rivals firms in the downstream market, which has the opposite
effect on the price of the final product. Finally, the global effect depends on
the size of double marginalization; which itself depends, as shown before, on
the technology used by the downstream firms. In this section, we use the above
example of decreasing returns technology in successive oligopolies, to analyse
and compare the effects of vertical integration according to the technology used
in the downstream market.
Collusive agreements reduces the total number of decision units operating
in the downstream and upstream markets and, thus, the corresponding number
of oligopolists in each of them (see Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds (1983)).
2It would be interesting to extend this result to the general class of decreasing returns Cobb-
Douglas production functions f(z) = zα, α < 1. Unfortunately, it turns out the solutions of
the model leads to combersome computations when α 6= 1
2
.
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Collusive outcomes are the Cournot equilibria corresponding to this reduced
number of oligopolists in each market.
Assume that k downstream firms i, i = 1, ..., k, say, and h upstream firms
j, j = 1, ..., h, say, collude and maximize joint profits (notice that all firms,
h + k, merge in one entity). We assume that k < n and h < m 3. After this
merger, we move from an initial situation comprising globally n +m firms to
a new one, with n − k + 1 firms in the downstream market and m − h in the
upstream one. Indeed, the integrated entity now internalizes output production
by using the input provided by the h upstream firms belonging to the new entity.
This general formulation covers as particular cases mergers including either only
downstream firms, or only upstream ones, which correspond to the usual case
of horizontal merging of firms.
The payoff of the integrated firm I is given by
ΠI(qI,q−I) = (1− qI −
∑
k 6=I
qk)qI − βq2I .
where qI denotes the quantity of output produced by the integrated entity. As
for the downstream firms i, i 6= I, not belonging to the integrated entity, they
have as payoffs4
Πi(qi, qI,q−i) = (1− qi −
n∑
k 6=i
qk)qi − pq2i ). (3)
Following the upstream and the downstream games explained in section (2), we
derive in Appendix 4, the equilibrium output and input quantities and prices,
for the entity of h+ k firms and the non-integrated upstream and downstream
firms. Comparing these variables with those obtained when dowsntream firm
use a linear technology, it is possible to analyse how collusive agreements can
be affected by technology.
First, in Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2007) we show in an illustration with two
downstream and three upstream firms, that a collusive agreement between one
downstream and one upstream firm can have diametrically opposite conse-
quences depending whether the technology is constant, or decreasing returns.
In the first case, the collusive agreement leads to a decrease of both the input
and output prices, while the reverse holds under decreasing returns. On the
other hand, the profitability of mergers also depends on technology. Indeed,
with cosntant returns, it can be shown that when n = m = 7, only vertical
integration of one downstream and one upstream firm, 1 : 1, can be profitable.
Similarly, for m = n = 10, the only profitable mergers are 1 : 1 and 2 : 2.
Finally, in all these profitable vertical integrations, the conseguence is higher
input and output price. These results are very different from those obtained
3This assumption guarantees that there always exists at least one unintegrated firm on
each side of the upstream market so that the integrated entity cannot exclude the unintegrated
downstream firms to have access to the input. A similar assumption in another approach to
collusion has been used by Gabszewicz and Hansen (1972).
4Notice that the set {k : k 6= i} includes the index I.
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when firms in the downstream firm use constant returns as in Salinger (1988).
For the same parametric values, Salinger (1988) shows that vertical integration
can determine lower output prices, and also, the number of profitable mergers
is much larger.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the down-
stream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas
type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this
assumption and those resulting from the traditional example considered in the
literature, namely, a constant returns technology. We find that when firms use
a decreasing returns technology rather than a linear one: (i) the profit of a
downstream firm can increase, when the upstream market is more competitive;
(ii) the input price does not tend to the corresponding marginal cost when the
number of firms in both markets tends to infinite; (iii) double marginalization
is lower and, finally, (iv) vertical integration arises less frequently, and leads to
higher prices for final consumers. These discrepancies between market behavior
corresponding to alternative technological conditions reveal how fragile are the
theoretical conclusions obtained when analyzing the interplay of firms’ strategies
in successive markets only using a linear technology in the downstream market,
as it is done so far in the literature. To get robust conclusions, a general the-
oretical framework for analyzing successive oligopolistic markets should clearly
be required.
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5 Appendix 1: Decreasing returns technology
In this section of the Appendix we derive the equilibrium quantities and prices
when downstream firms use decreasing returns technology. The profits of the
ith downstream firm at the vector of strategies (qi, q−i) obtains as
Πi(qi, q−i) = (1− qi − Σk 6=iqk)qi − pq2i .
Taking the first derivative and solving it in q, we get at the symmetric solution
q∗(p) =
1
(n+ 2p+ 1)
; i = 1...n. (4)
Similarly, re-expressing equation (??), and solving it for s, we obtain
s∗(p) =
β − p(ms∗)
∂p(ms)/∂s
. (5)
The input price p∗ must satisfy the system of equations n (q∗(p))2 = ms∗(p),
(??) and (??). To derive the explicit equilibrium price, we can proceed as
follows. First, we identify the total demand for input at the symmetric solution
of the first game, using (??) namely n(n+2p+1) . Then, using the input clearing
market condition, the equality n
(n+2p+1)2
= Σmk=1sk(p) has to be satisfied at
any vector of strategies (s1,..., sj , ..sm) in the input market. Accordingly, the
equality
p(Σmk=1sk) =
√
n
4Σmk=1sk
− n+ 1
2
. (6)
must hold for any vector of strategies in the input market. Substituting (??)
into the profit function of an upstream firm, Γj(sj , s−j) we have
Γj(sj , s−j) = (
√
n
4Σmk=1sk
− n+ 1
2
)sj − βsj ,
Notice that the profit function Γj(sj , s−j) is concave in sj , j = 1, ...m, so that
we can use the first order necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize an
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equilibrium. Accordingly, at the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the upstream
game, we obtain
s∗(m,n) =
n (2m− 1)2
4m3 (2β + 1 + n)2
.
Hence the profit Γj(m,n) of an upstream firm at the symmetric equilibrium of
the upstream game obtains as
Γj(m,n) =
n(2m− 1)
8 (n+ 2β + 1)m3
.
Finally, the equilibrium price p∗(m,n) in the input market obtains as
p∗(m,n) =
n+ 1 + 4mβ
2 (2m− 1) .
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities
q∗of output selected by the downstream firms, as given by (??), we get
q∗(m,n) =
2m− 1
2m (2β + n+ 1)
so that, given the technology, the equilibrium input quantities used by down-
stream firms writes as
z∗(m,n) =
(2m− 1)2
4m2 (2β + n+ 1)2
Therefore, the resulting output price pi∗(m,n) in the downstream market obtains
as
pi∗(m,n) = 1− n (2m− 1)
2m (2β + n+ 1)
.
The profit Πi(m,n) of a downstream firm at equilibrium in the corresponding
game is thus equal to
Πi(m,n) =
1
8
(4mβ + 4m+ n− 1) 2m− 1
m2 (2β + n+ 1)2
.
Notice that Πi > 0, - a requirement needed to guarantee the survival of firms
in the downstream market.
6 Appendix 2: Constant returns technology
We consider exactly the same case as in appendix 1, with the exception that
the technology f(z) shared by the downstream firms is now given by
f(z) = αz, α > 0
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as in Salinger and Gaudet and Van Long (with α equal to 1 in the latter case).We
assume that α ≥ β: this assumption guarantees that the marginal cost of pro-
ducing the input does not exceed its marginal product in the production of
output. The profits Πi(qi, q−i) of the ith downstream firm at the vector of
strategies (qi, q−i) now obtains as
Πi(qi, q−i) = (1− qi − Σk 6=iqk)qi − pzi.
The payoff function Γj(sj , s−j) of the jth upstream firms writes as we have
Γj(sj , s−j) = p(sj , s−j)sj − βsj .
Accordingly, closely following the above section, or the exisiting papers us-
ing constant returns technology (see Salinger (1988) or Gaudet and Van Long
(1996)), at the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage game, the individual
input supply writes as
s∗(m,n) =
n (α− β)
α2(n+ 1)(m+ 1)
,
so that the equilibrium price in the input market obtains as
p∗(m,n) =
α+mβ
m+ 1
. (7)
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the quantities z∗i of input
bought by each downstream firm, we get
z∗(m,n) =
m(α− β)
α2 (n+ 1) (m+ 1)
,
so that
q∗i (m,n) =
m(α− β)
α (n+ 1) (m+ 1)
.
Accordingly, the resulting output price pi∗(m,n) in the downstream market
obtains as
pi∗(m,n) =
α(1 +m+ n) +mnβ
α (n+ 1) (m+ 1)
.
6.1 Appendix 3: Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1: The profit of a downstream firm may decrease if the competition
in the upstream market is fiercer. For instance, when the number of firms in
the dowsntream market does not exceed 3, profits of a dowsntream firm always
decreases when the number of upstream firms increases.
Proof. The derivative of the profit of a downstream firm is 3m+n−mn−1+2mβ
4(n+1)2m3
.
Hence, the sign depends only on the sign of the numerator, 3m+n−mn−1+2mβ.
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The derivative is positive iff m < 1−n2β+3−n , and negative iff m >
1−n
2β+3−n . It is
immediate that the last expression is always true for β > n−32 .
Proposition 2: Under decreasing returns (resp. constant returns), when the
number of replications of the basic economy tends to ∞, the equilibrium input
price does not (resp. does ) converge to upstream firms’ marginal cost.
Proof. We consider the situation where the number of replicas r tends to
infinite. So, we calculate the limit for r → +∞ of the expression of the input
price:
Proof.
lim
r→∞ p
∗(rm, rn) =
1
4
n
m
+ β.
Proof. Clearly, the price p∗ at the limit does not converge to β, unless m
converges to infinite more quickly than n.
Proposition 3:Double marginalization is lower when downstream firms use
decreasing returns than when they use constant returns technology.
Proof. Consider α(1+m+n)+mnβα(n+1)(m+1) +
n(2m−1)
2m(2β+n+1) < 1.We prove that the inequality
is false. It is easy to check that the first derivative with respect to α of each
side of the left hand side of the inequality is negative. We know that β < α.
Therefore, assuming α = β, we can consider the inequaltiy β(1+m+n)+mnββ(n+1)(m+1) +
n(2m−1)
2m(2β+n+1) < 1 where we just make the left hand side bigger. The solution of
such inequality is a subset of the original inequality.
Solving for β, we find that it is true only for β < 0. This is not an admissible
set of β, therefore the inequality is false, and the price with decreasing returns
technology is smaller than the price with constant returns.
6.2 Appendix 4: Vertical integration solution
Following the solution of the game in the benchmark model, at the symmetric
equilibrium in the upstream market, each unintegrated firm supplies a quantity
s∗jof input which obtains as
s∗(k, h) =
1
4
(2m− 2h− 1)2 (n− k)
(n− k + 2β + 2)2 (m− h)3 .
while the input price writes as
p∗(k, h) =
1
4 (β + 1)
(
(n− k + 2β + 2)
(
2 (2β + 1) (m− h)2 − 1
)
− 2β (n− k)
)
.
Then, substituting p∗ in the expression of qi and qI , we obtain
qi(k, h) =
1
2 (n− k + 2β + 2) (m− h)2 ,
qI(k, h) =
2 (n− k + 2β + 2) (m− h)2 − (n− k)
4 (n− k + 2β + 2) (β + 1) (m− h)2 .
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The price of the output then obtains as
pi∗(k, h) = (1− 1
2 (n− k + 2β + 2) (m− h)2 (n− k)
−2 (n− k + 2β + 2) (m− h)
2 − (n− k)
4 (n− k + 2β + 2) (β + 1) (m− h)2 ).
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